

Long-Term Data Analysis for Improved Risk Assessment regarding Orbital Assets

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Actual situation in the implementation and development of risk assessment in Outer Space

Most of today's Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) solutions and their usage scenarios consider risk assessment in the form of forecasting single events on a day-to-day basis, such as supporting collision risk analysis by providing conjunction prediction messages. While this represents a highly adequate quick-response process triggering the appropriate crisis management actions, this approach usually neither considers past events and historical anomaly evolutions nor does it lead to further forecasts beyond the single events in focus. Big Data (BD) analytics helps approach the problem in a different manner. Like for satellite telemetry and satellite communications, long-term data archives of orbital data and resulting multiple conjunction prediction data can be evaluated under the rules of systemic principles, logical constraints and methodological procedures to reveal insights on highly complex dependencies. These insights are seen as a potential key to performing an assessment of a “global” risk in outer space activities, to describing its history, and – considering relevant scenarios – to forecasting its potential future evolution.

Various efforts worldwide are spent to implement Space Tracking Management (STM) with the goal to comply with the UNOOSA COPOUS Long Term Sustainability Guidelines. These efforts show:

- the absence of a subordinate guiding methodology and framework structuring and coordinating all activities,
- missing metrics to squeeze success, deviations with comparable key performance parameters (KPI's)

To eliminate the shortcomings, a worldwide accepted framework, the UN-SPIDER Sendai Framework, is proposed.

The Sendai Framework requires in Priority 4 (Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction) the monitoring of the actual risk of hazards.








In our presentation, we also discuss the path towards a Space Pandemic Dashboard (as an analogy to current climate change and corona virus visualizations) and how historical data and its analysis can contribute to predicting future evolutions. Like in the relation between weather forecasting and climate analysis, like in the relation between medical status and epidemiological scenarios, the steps described represent the advancing from Space Debris Event Monitoring to Space Debris Risk Management. We draft the elements for a “global” risk estimation process and attempt to visualize the various risk drivers and their interrelations. When we speak about risk in this context, we need to distinguish between the risk on the pure orbital infrastructure, i.e. the risk on the investment, and the operability of orbital objects including the availability, reliability and integrity of the services realised using these assets, i.e. the operational risk (which, as we know, leads to the business continuity risk).

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The conjunctions

The graph (Top) shows all conjunctions of the Starlink constellation in red (internal) and yellow (external) with all others avoidable conjunctions in grey in the background depending on orbit.

The high-risk events within the given constellation are represented by the size of the bubbles (high risk is bigger size). The regularity of the internal conjunctions within the constellation appear as red lines in the same orbit height. In the given data set the closest conjunction was between STARLINK-1206 and STARLINK-1618 as happened on the 2021-01-02.



Orbital Lane Conjunction Probability

The split of the risk of a 10m conjunction into orbital lanes, the recalculation of the conjunction probability for each lane per day separately in the plot to show the distribution is per lane and how it changes over time. The <10m conjunction probability has a similarity to the number of conjunctions but not in the same form. The number of days between a conjunction is the inverse value of the conjunction probability, multiplied by 100. The conclusion here is that using TLEs does not show a significant risk of a conjunction or collision as, for example, in the 600km orbit lane the conjunction probability is only 0.2% that gives a statistic time gap of 500 Days. If 'system noise' (items >1cm) are included the time gap is then reduced to 14 Days.